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action, as much so as if he had sued alone; in the latter each will
stand on his own personal merits or individual defence.
Nor have we gone into the question whether the authority of a
partner to bind his copartner within the scope of the partnership,
may not be revoked or restricted as to executory contracts, with
notice to the party dealing with him to. that effect. We are
inclined to think that it may, and that it was so held in the case
of Leavitt vs. Peck, 3 Conn. 124. But the payment of an existing debt to one of the partners, notwithstanding the request of the
other that it should not be so paid, is a very different matter.
Debtors have rights of their own, and they are not dependent apon
the continuance of partnership authority for the discharg6 of their
duties. Unless there has been an assignment with notice, or an
injunction from Chancery, they may treat each partner of the firm
to which they are indebted as representing the whole company,
however numerous.
We advise a new trial, unless the amount of the payment in
question shall be remitted on the record.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
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by a client to pay money to a counsel for his advocacy, whether made
before, or during, or after the litigation, has no binding effect.
The relation of counsel and client renders the parties mutually incapable of making
any legal contract of hiring and service concerning advocacy in litigation.
A barrister became the advocate of the female defendant, and during the continuation of the litigation she made repeated requests to him for exertion' as such,
and repeatedly promised to remunerate him for the same; and after the end of
the litigation she spoke of the amount of this remuneration, and admitted the
amount of debt due for such remuneration to be a certain sum, and promised to
pay it: Held, that these facts did not constitute any obligation on the part of
the defendant to pay.
Si promise
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This was an action of account stated with defendant's wife, dum
sola. The pleadings, as they eventually stood, consisted of a count
on an account stated, plea nunquam, indebitatus and thereupon
issue.
At the trial a verdict was found for plaintiff, with 20,0001. damages, with leave reserved to move to enter a verdict for the defendant.
A rule having been obtained, accordingly,
Nov. 10, 1862, Kennedy in person showed cause.-I contend, first,
that I am entitled to recover under the rule laid down in Lampleigh
vs. Brathwaite, Hob. 105, 1 Smith L. 0. 185, that a voluntary
courtesy, moved by a previous request, will uphold a subsequent
promise of payment; secondly, that I have a good right of action
under the promise to compensate me for loss and damage, irrespectively of the claim for services as counsel; thirdly, that remuneration for my services as counsel is recoverable under the express
contract, and that the count on an account stated is applicable to
each of these cases: Harris's Case, Dyer 272, note 29; Sidnam.
vs. Worthington, Cro. Eliz. 42; Townsend vs. Hunt, Cro. Car. 408;
Bosden vs. Thinne, Yel. 400; Marsh vs. Rainsford, 2 Leo. 111.
Comyn's Dig. Act. on Case in AssuMpSit, B. 12. This rule is so
clear that I should not dwell on it but for a misapprehension which
appears to have been created by the note in Wennall vs. Abney, 8
Bos. & Pull. 247, and the language of Lord DENMAX in -Eastwood
vs. Kenyon, 11 Ad. & El. 438; and Roscorla vs. Thomas, 3 Q. B.
234. The whole law on this subject was discussed in Bradford vs.
Roulston, 8 Irish Rep. 468; Veitch vs. Russell, 3 Q. B. 928;
Knowles vs. Mitchell, 13 E. 249; Highmore vs. Primrose, 5 M. &
S. 65 ; Roper vs. Holland, 3 A. & E. 99 ; Pardoe vs. Price,16 M.
& W. 458; -Edwards vs. Lowndes, 1 E. & Bl. 89; Toyham vs.
Morecroft, 8 E. & Bl. 972; Moor vs. Hill, 2 Peake 10; Cleaver
vs. Moor, 3 Jur. N. S. 475; Greaves vs. Cook, 2 Jur. N. S. 475;
Cocking vs. Ward, 1 0. B. 858. Secondly. The magnitude of my
loss or the benefit to the defendant is immaterial. Sturlyn vs.
Albany, Cro. Eliz. 67; Haigh vs. Brookes, 10 Ad. & El. 309;
Bunn vs. Guy, 4 E. 190; Shadwell vs. Shadwell, 9 0. B., N. S.,
.159. Thirdly. It is laid down by Blackstone, 8 Com. 28, that
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counsel cannot maintain an action for fees, and he refers to 1 Chan.
Rep. 38, and Sir John Davies' Rep. pref. 22.
The fee, which was at a late period called "honorarium," did
not form the subject of what the Romans called "actio" (and this
is the origin of Blackstone's mistake), but by the extraordinaria
cognitio before the magistrate or prceses of the province. Sandars'
Institutes, 475; Dig. 50, tit. 13. The fees therefore at Rome
differed from those in England in three ways-they were recoverable, limited in amount, and payable after the business was done.
The term honorarium,as applicable to a counsel's fee, was for the
first time introduced by Sir JoHN DAvIES, in that preface which
Blackstone refers to, and which is so often cited as an authority
for the alleged custom; but there is no truth in this statement, and
this honorarium must have been the creation of his own brain.
Formerly counsel communicated directly with their clients without
the intervention of attorneys, and to meet them the serjeants and
apprentices used to frequent the Previse or portico of St. Paul's.
Chaucer 311; Hollinshed Chron. 1, 304; Hall's Chron. 503;
Fortescue, p. 196, Amos' ed.; Dugd. Orig. 142; Stowe's Survey 1,
745; Addison's Templars 375; Ryley's Parl. Plead. 104; Crabb's
Hist. Eng. Law, Then as to fees, which word means a stipend,
and not an honorarium; and the words "salary," "hire," and
"wages," are frequently applied to counsel's remuneration. 27 Ed.
3, c. 29; 5 Rich. 2, c. 16; 23 Hen. 6, c. 10; Johnson's Life of
Coke 1, 79; And in the mirror of justice a serjeant's fee is called
salary. [ERLE, C. J.-Down to my time Queen's counsel received
"salary."]-Then as to the fees being recoverable, in Brownlow's
Entries (published in 1854), p. 172, there is a declaration in debt
by a counsel, stating "that the defendant had retained him to be
his counsel in any action in which he should sue or be sued, pro
salaries 6s. 8d. a year," claiming five years' arrears, with a count
for 6s. 8d. for money lent. Also Rastall's Entries, p. 194, tit.
"Debt," pl. 3; Id. p. 203; p. 202, pl. 6, 7, 8; Id. p. 429, tit.
Maintenance," pl. 10, 11; 34 Hen. 6, Year Book 27 ; 5 Foss's
Judges of England 91; Manning's Serviens ad Legem, p. 272;
Plowden, pp. 32, 160; Com. Dig. "Debt," A. 8; Cro. Jac. 482;
8 Mod. R. 42. We also find that actions were brought against
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counsel. Year Books, 14 Hen. 6, fo.'18; 20 Hen. 4, fo. 34, Rolle's
Abr. "Action sur case," 6, 91 ; Moore vs. Rowe, 1 Chan. Rep.
He also referred to Thornhill vs. Evans, 2 Atk. 830; Morris vs.
Hunt, 1 Chit. 544; Hobartvs. Butler, 9 Tr. Crom. Rep. 157 ; Doe
vs. Hall,15 Q. B. 171; -Eganvs. Kensington Union, 3 Q. B. 935;
Re May, 2 Jur. N. S. 1109; Vivany vs. Warne, 4 Esp. 46;
Hoggins vs. Gordon, 3 Q. B. 436 ; Marsackvs. Webber, 6 H. & N.
5; Re Ball, 2 Jur. N. S.; Swinfen vs. Lord Chelmsford, 5 H. &
N. 919.
Macaulay, Q. C. in support of the rule.-There is no evidence
to support a contract of account stated. If terms imported into
an account are not recoverable, no question can arise on any account
stated thereon. Truman vs. Hurst, 3 R. 40; Petch vs. Lyon, 9
Q. B. 147; Frenchvs. French, 2 M. & G. 644; Thomas vs. Hawkes,
8 M. & W. 140; .Penrice vs. Parke, Finch 7.5; Thornhill vs.
Evans, 2 Atk. 330, 332; Box vs. Barnaby, Hobart 117; Wood
vs. Dounes, 18 Ves: 120; Huguenin vs. Baseley, 2 W. & T. Tud.
L. C. 462; Earle vs. Hopwood, 9 C. B., N. S., 566.
Field on the same side.- Whitehead vs. Howard, 5 Moore 105;
Pierce vs. Evans, 2 C. M. & R. 294; Lubbock vs. Tribe, 3 M. &W.
607; Scadding vs. Eyles, 9 Q. B. 858; Brooks vs. Bockett, 9 Q.
B. 849.
No action lies on ordinary fees, nor on an express contract by
counsel for work done as counsel. Vin. Abr. " Counsellor," pl.
22, covers the second proposition as well as the first: Poucher vs.
Morman, 3 B. & C. 744; Hoggins vs. Gordon, 3 Q. B. 474. Forms
of action are no doubt given as in Rastall's Entries 194; but there
the judgment went by default, and it is a pregnant fact that from
that time- no authority can be found. The plaintiff relies chiefly
on Lampleigh vs. Brathwaite, but the ground of that decision is
questionable. Roscorla vs. Thomas, 3 Q. B. 234, and Kay vs.
Dutton, 2 D. & L. 291, have shaken Lampleigh vs. Brathwaite.
Jan. 16, 1863.-ERL ,, C. J.-In this case the defendant obtained
a rule to show cause why the verdict for the plaintiff should not be
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set aside, and either entered for the defendant if there was no
evidence of a debt, or for a new trial if the verdict was against the
evidence. The material facts upon the question are, in the course
of the suit of Swinfen vs. Swinfen the plaintiff, a barrister, became
the advocate of the present defendant, and during the continuance
of that litigation she made repeated requests to him for exertions
as an advocate, and repeatedly promised to remunerate him for the
same, and after the end of the litigation she spoke of the amount
of this remuneration; and for the purposes of the present judgment
we assume that she admitted the amount of debt due for such
remuneration to be 20,0001., and promised to pay it. These facts
are no evidence to support the verdict if the promise of the defendant did not constitute any obligation; and we are of opinion that
it did not. We consider that a promise by a client to pay money
to a counsel for his advocacy, whether made before, or during, or
after the litigation, has no binding effect;. aad,- furthermore, that
the relation of counsel and client renders the parties mutually
incapable of making any legal contract of hiring and service concerning advocacy in litigation. For authority in support of these
propositions we place reliance on the fact that in all the records of
our law, from the earliest time till now, there is no trace whatever
either that an advocate has ever maintained a suit against his client
for his fees in litigation, or the client against an advocate for breach
of a contract to advocate; and as the number of precedents has
been immense the force of this negative fact is proportionally great.
To this we add the tradition and understanding of the profession,
both as known to living memory and as expressed in former times.
Sir JOHN DAVIES (Davies's Rep., Pref. 23) declares that understanding at the beginning of the 17th century, whexi he says "that the
fees of professors of the law are not duties certain, growing due by
contract for labor or service, but gifts; not merces, but honorarium."
Sir JoI.N DAVIES would have ample experience of the rules of the
profession from his eminence in the law, and his opinion is entitled
to much weight. Lord STOWELL, as appears in a work remarkable
for learned research (Wallace's Reporters 27), speaks of him as
"a poet, a lawyer, and a statesman, and highly distinguished in each
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of these characters." Lord HALE declares the same understanding
of the profession in the note to Co. Lit. 295 a, saying, "a counsellor
cannot bring any action (id est for his fees), for he is.not compellable
to be a counsellor. His, fee is honorarium, and not a debt;" and
for this he cites Lord NOTTINGRAM'S MSS. The same note coiftains
the opinion of Mr. Butler to the same effect, saying that in England
the fees of counsel are honorary in the strict acceptation of the
word. Blackstone also (vol. 8, p. 28) declares the same understand.
ing: "A counsel can maintain no action for his fees, which are
given not as locatio or conductio, but as quiddam honorarium,not
as salary or hire, but as mere gratuity." As we know of no authorities that conflict with these, we only add the names of the judges
who have had occasion to declare an opinion to the same effect, and
they are Lord HARDWICKE, Lord KENYON, KINDERSLEY, V. C.,
PIGOT, C. B., of Ireland, and BAYLEY and BEsT, Js. See also Thorn,
hill vs. Evans, 2 Atk. 311 ; Turner vs. Phillips, 1 Peake 166 ; I
vs. Butler, 9 Jur. C. L. Rep.
Be Vay, 4 Jur. N. S. i169 ; 157; and Morris vs. Hunt, 1 Chit. 544. These are authorities for
holding that the counsel cannot contract for his hire in litigation.
The same authorities we rely on to show that the client cannot contfact for the service of a counsel in litigation. There is the same
absence of any precedent for such an action, and the reason for the
one incapacity is good for both.
We proceed to the authorities on which the plaintiff relied.
Instead of examining each citation separately, we think it more
convenient to take them in classes, and to give-the reason why each
class appears to us to have no weight. The proposition is confined
to incapacity for contracts concerning advocacy in litigation. This
class of contracts is distinguished from other claeses on account of
the privileges and responsibility attached to such advocacy, and on
this ground we consider the cases unconnected with such advocacy
to be irrelevant. Thus the barrister who contracted to serve as
returning officer (Egan vs. Kensington Union, 3 Q. B. 234), and
the barristers who contracted to serve as arbitrators ( Virany vs.
Warne, 4 Esp. 46; Hoqgins vs. Gordon, 3 Q. B. 466; larsack
vs. Webber, 6 H. & Norm. 5), and the barristers who contracted
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either for an annual sum by way of retainer, 39 Hen. 6, fol. 21, pl.
31, or for an annuity pro consilio impenso et impendendo, Plowd.
82, 160, made contracts not concerning litigation, and therefore not
within the incapacity here in question. It may be that a contract
for a general retaining fee for a counsel may not bind at the present
day, because it relates in substance to litigation, and so may be
distinguished from annuities to a standing counsel who was required
to guide by his advice in the management of property and general
affairs. The change in the habits of courts and the practice of the
bar since the last-mentioned cases were decided, has probably made
the position of an advocate now as different from that of standing
counsel then as the position of the clergy now differs from that
which they held when private chaplains were hired to serve as
chaplainsland perform other work, and were prosecuted for breach
of their contracts to serve under the statute of 23 Edward 3, relating to laborers, in one of which prosecutions, against a parochial
chaplain for breach of !his contract to serve as seneschal and be
parochial chaplain, the Court of C. P. thought that as far as related
to his duty as chaplain he might be considered to be in the service
of God, and therefore not within a statute expressed to relate to
mowers and reapers and the like, but hesitated so to decide till they
had consulted their brethren of the other bench, and had their
sanction. But, be that as it may, fees unconnected with litigation
'are irrelevant to our present judgment, and this distinction seems
to be taken in Mingay vs. Hammond, Cro. Jac. 482, where the
plaintiff sued for an annuity pro consilio. The defendant pleaded
a refusal of the plaintiff to sign a bill in the Star Chamber, and
the plea was held bad because a counsellor with such a fee.is not
bound to put his hand to every bill, but only to give counsel.
With respect to the dicta cited by Mr. Kennedy, relating to the
liability of counsel for their conduct as advocates, they are all
considered and overruled in the action of Swinfen vs. Lord OhelmsSome relate to retainers relating to
ford, 5 Hurl. &- N. 918.
purchases of land, or similar services, and so are not within the
incapacity here in question, 1 Hen. 6, fol. 18, pl. 10 ; and, although
the dictum of PASTON, C. J., 14 H. 6, fo. 18, pl. 58, "that action
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lies against a serjeant who fails to attend in court," and a dictum
by Stokes, counsel, to the, same effect, relate to litigation, yet they
are mere remarks in the course of an argument, and not adjudications, and they were expressly overruled as before mentioned.
Mr. Kennedy cited Rastall's Eat. 2, as containing precedents
for actions against an attorney or counsel, for not appearing, in
court according to his retainer; but the book contains no entry
against a counsel for that wrong. There are three entries in suc.
cession. The first is against an attorney and is for that wrong.
The second precedent is against a counsel who was retained to advise
about the purchase of a manor, and betrayed his client's secrets
and interests, and is not an entry which relates to litigation; and
the third is against a counsel, but it is for a penalty under a statute, for taking retainers on both sides as an ambidexter. The
citation from Rastall, therefore, does not suppqrt the plaintiff's
argument. A considerable part of Mr. Kennedy's learned research
consisted of anecdotes of various classeg relating to barristers,
-irrelevant to the point for adjudication, because irrelevant to capacity or incapacity for contracting for advocacy. Such are the anecdotes relating to the habits of barristers when they held communication with their clients personally, before the rights and duties
of attorneys and solicitors were ascertained, and the advocate did
the work of each branch of the profession-habits which continued
in Jersey until lately: (see Jersey Case, 13 Moo. P.... 263.) Such
also are those relating to alleged endeavours by barristers to obtain larger fees. Whether this has been done or not, and whether
a communication in respect of the amount of *the fees be made to
the client by the clerk or the barrister, the nature of the fee is not
altered, nor is the right to sue for it effcted thereby. Such also
are those relating to payment after instead of before the se,'vice is
performed. In England the general usage is pre-payment. On the
continent, under the Roman law and the modern French law, and in
some exceptional cases in England, the fee is paid after the service.
But again, the nature of the fee is not altered by the time of payment.
The anecdotes in each of these classes show that the payments are
of gratuities and not of debts, and, so far as they are to be noticed
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for adjudication, tend to support the defendant's case. As to express contracts, certain dicta by PIGOT, 0. B. (Hobartvs. 1 uck,
9 Ir. 0. L. Rep. 27), and by POLLOCK, C. B. (Swinfen vs. Lord
Chelmsford), were cited for the purpose of proving that a barrister
had capacity to make himself liable under a special contract with
his client concerning advocacy, though not by an implied contract.
We think that the effect of those dicta has been misunderstood. A
special contract differs from-an implied contract only in the mode
f proof. If a brief marked with a fee for a given place of trial is
left in silence, there would be some evidence of an implied contract
to pay the fee were there no usage to the contrary, and no incapacity for such a contract. If the same brief is left with an express
contract to pay the feei there would be an express contract if there
were no incapacity. Where the service of the barrister according
to usage is for a gratuity, that usage would be presumed to continue unless there was an express contract rebutting that presumption, and where there is no incapacity the presumption from usage
is rebutted by an express contract. POLLOCK, 0. B., does not refer
to any authorities, but the cases referred to by PIGOT, C. B., show
that this was his meaning, for he refers to the cases" above mentioned, where barristers, either as returning officers or as arbitrators, sustained actions for their fees. The incapacity depends on
the. subject-matter of the contract, not on the mode of proof.
When the contract is proved its incidents are the same whatever
was the kind of evidence adduced for proof. If there is incapacity,
words and implication are alike nullities, and no contract can result; but where there is no incapacity, and there are conflicting
presumptions in respect of the consensus essential to create contract,
there evidence of express words of clear meaning is decisive proof.
In this sense the observation of WOOD, V. C. (Attorney-General
vs. College of Physicians, 1 Jo. & H. 561), must be understood,
saying, "That a physician might recover his fees if he makes a
special contract." We know' of no incapacity affecting a physician
according to usage, the practice being for a fee, which is honorarium,
not merces; and no action lies where the parties are presumed to
have acted according to this usage; but if the presumption is re-
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butted by evidence of an express contract, such contract binds,
and a physician may sue. and be sued thereon, as was held in
Veitch vs. Russell, 3 Q. B. 928.
Mr. Kennedy argued that under the civil law an advocate could
sue for his fees, and that Blackstone made a mistake in referring
thereto to support a contrary opinion. In this it appears to us
that the mistake is on the part of the plaintiff. Throughout the
whole growth of the civil law, from the foundation of Rome to the
Digest of Justinian, not only was the advocate always under incapacity to make any contract for his remuneration, but also
throughout a part of that time he was under prohibition from receiving any gain for his services; whether the same be donum, or
mercee, or honorarium,is immaterial; the substance of the law was
invariable, he never could contract for merees, though during part
of the time he might lawfully accept a donum. In the beginning
all agree that the .patron received no money for advocacy ; afterwards he took gifts to an excess, and was restrained in the year
550 A. u. c., by the "'Lex Cincia de donis et muneribus ne quis ea ob
causam orandam caperet." If gifts were prohibited, d fortiori
contracts for payments would not be allowed. Thig prohibition of
all gifts for advocacy was further enforced by Augustus in the year
732 A. u. c., commanding advocates to plead gratuitously, and for
breach they were ordered to refund fourfold. "This prohibition against all gifts to advocates was relaxed in a time of great
debasement, when, according to the passage in Tacitus referred to
by Blackstone (Annal. lib. 11, c. 7), " Noni quicquam publiem
mercis tam venale fuit quam advocatorum perfidia.'' The Senate
sought to enforce the Cincian law forbidding all gifts for protection
against abuses on the part of advocates. "Sicinius, an advocate of
singular infamy, offered some of the arguments which have been
urged in support of mercenary advocacy. The Emperor took an
'intermediate course, and by a decree fixed the maximum which an
advocate might lawfully receive by way of gift at 801., and made
him liable to refund if he took more. The words of Tacitus are"Claudius capiendis pecuniis modum statuit ad dena sestertia, quem
egressi repetundarum tenerentur." The Senate made a further
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effort in the same direction, passing a law that every suitor before
he took any step in the suit should swear that he had neither
given nor contracted to give any money for advocacy. Pliny, in
the passage referred to by Blackstone (Epist. lib. 5, 21), writing
of a new edict by a printor to enforce practically some recent laws,
says: "Sub edicto erat senatus consultum, hoc omnes qui quid
negotii haberent, priusquam agerent, jurare jubebantur nihil se ob
advocationem cuiquam dedisse, promississe, cavisse. His enim
verbis et mille prmterea et venire advocationes, -et emi vetabantur.
Peractis tamen negotiis permittebat pecuniam duntaxat decem
millia dare." Although after this time gifts within the limited
amount were lawful, still contracts with advocates, during litigation, are not shown to have been ever at any time sanctioned by
the law of Rome. Mr. Kennedy referred to the Digest, lib. 50,
tit. 13, art. 10 and 12, to prove that an advocate could sue for his
fee under the extraordinary cognisance of the "prmses," but we do
not find that these articles prove his contention. Art. 10 seems to
relate to a suit by a client against an advocate to make him refund
so much of a fee already paid as exceeded the legitimate amount,
and gives the principle for estimating what that amount should be:
"In honorariis advocatorum ita versari debet judex ut pro modo
litis, pro advocati facundig, et fori consuetudine in quo acturus erat
estimationem adhibeat, dummodo licitum honorarium non egrediatur." The article concludes with a rescript applicable only to
refunding part of a fee: "Eam duntaxat pecuniam qumP modum
legitimum egressa est repetere debet." Art. 12 relates to securities and bargains for fees, and gives the rule when a suit can be
maintained thereon. The effect seems to be that a promise while
the litigation is pending does not bind, but that a security given
after the cause is at an end may be enforced if the sum secured,
together with the sums paid, does not exceed the legitimate
amount.
We have now considered as much of the authorities referred to
as seems to us to be relevant, and in our judgment they support
the propositions on which the defendant relies-viz., that the relation of counsel and client in litigation creates an incapacity to con

KENNEDY vs. BROUN.

tract for hiring and service as an advocate. If the authorities were
doubtful, and it was necessary to resort to princinle, this same proposition appears to us to be founded on good reason. The facts of
the present- case forcibly show some of the evils which would attend
both on the advocate and the client, if the hiring of counsel was
made binding. In this case the advocate, by disclosing words of
intimate confidence which passed in moments of helpless anxiety,
has raised the phantom of a contract for a sum of monstrous
amount, and of this we hope we may say that there is no one in the
profession of the plaintiff who would be willing to accept from him
this verdict of 20,0001. as a gift. In the present case, too, if the
client compares the competence and peace secured for her, by her
former advocate, with the perils and the miseries of wearisome litigation derived from her later advocate, the contrast may suggest to
her that gratuity is preferable to contract as a mode of remunerating advocates. But it is not merely on such considerations as
these, that this law is based. The incapacity of the advocate in
litigation to make a contract of hiring effects the integrity and dignity of advocates, and so is in close relation with the highest of
human interests-n Lmely, the administration of justice. We are
aware. that in the class of advocates, as in every other numerous
class, there will be bad men taking the wages of evil, and therewith also, for the most part, the early blight that -waits upon the
servants of evil. We are aware also that there will be many men
of ordinary powers performing ordinary duties without praise or
blame; but the advocate entitled to permanent success must unite
high powers of intellect with high principles oi' duty; his faculties
and acquirements are tested by a ceaseless competition proportioned to the prizes to be gained-that is, wealth and power and
honor without, and active exercise for the best gifts of mind
within. He is trusted with interests, and privileges, and powers
almost to an unlimited degree. His client must trust to him at
times for fortune, and character, and life. The law trusts him
with a privilege in respect of liberty of speech which is in practice
bounded only by his own sense of duty; and he may have to speak
upon subjects concerning the deepest interests of social life, and
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the innermost feelings of the human soul. The law also trusts
him with a power of insisting on answers to the most painful questioning, and this power again is in practice only controlled by his
-awn view of the interests of truth. It is of the last importance
'that the sense of duty should be in active energy proportioned to
,the magnitude of these interests. If the law is that the advocate
is incapable of contracting for hire to serve, when he has undertaken an advocacy, his words and acts ought to be guided by a
sense of duty-that is to say, duty to his client, binding him to
exert every faculty and privilege and power in order that he may
maintain that client's right, together with duty to the court and
himself, binding him to guard against abuse of the powers and
privileges intrusted to him by a constant recourse to his own sense
of right. If an advocate with these qualities stands by the client
in time of his utmost need, regardless alike, of popular clamor
and powerful interest, speaking with the boldness which a sense of
duty can alone recomiend, we say the service of such an advocate
is beyond all price to the client; and such men are the guarantees
to communities for the maintenance of their dearest rights, and the
words of such men carry a wholesome spirit to all who are influenced
by them. Such is the system of advocacy intended by the law,
requiring the remuneration to be by gratuity; but if the law allowed
the advocate to make a contract of hiring and service, it may be
that his mind would be lowered, and that his performance would
be guided by the words of his contract rather than by principles of
duty; that words sold and delivered according to contract for the
purpose of earning hire would fail of creating sympathy and persuasion in proportion as they were suggestive of effrontery aiid selfishness, and that the standard of duty throughout the whole class
of advocates might be degraded. It may also well be that if contracts for hire could be made by advocates, an interest in litigation
might be created, contrary to the policy of the law against maintenance, and the rights of attorneys might be materially sacrificed
and their duties be imperfectly performed by unscrupulous advocates; and these evils, and others that may be suggested, would be
unredeemed by a single benefit that we can perceive. The subVOL. XI. -24
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ject has been often and ably discussed, so that we have already
said more than sufficient. We would only add, that in the growth
of the English law the advocates have been important agents in
establishing the liberty 9f thought and speech and action which1
has resulted from the contests in courts where such liberty has been i
contended for. The English advocates in our historical trials are,
entitled to be gratefully remembered, and it must not *be forgotten
that their minds were trained in the practice of advocacy without
any contract. So also the Roman jurists are entitled to be gratefully remembered, because their intuitive sense of right showed to
them where right was in the conflicts of interest perpetually arising,
as the relations of man to man multiplied, and their words have
helped to guide succeeding generations in their search for right
when similar conflicts arose. And it must not be forgotten that
throughout the Roman system it was held that an advocate and a
professor of law would be degraded by a contract of hiring, and
that his reward was, to be gratuitous. Mr. Kennedy has cited the
Digests, lib. 50, tit. 13, arts. 10 and 12, on which we have remarked
above. The title relates to the limits of the extraordinariacognitio
of the prceses, and it may not be superfluous to add art. 5, expressly
excluding therefrom suits by the class of professors of law for a
reason applicable to all advocates. ."Proinde ne juris quidem civilis
professoribus jus est quidem res sanctissima civilig sapientia, sed
qum pretio nummario non sit estimanda neque dehonestanda, qugedam
tametsi honeste accipiuntur, inhoneste tamen petuntur." On principle then, as well as on authority, we think that there is good.
reason for holding that the relation of advocate and glient in litigation creates the incapacity to make a contract of hiring as an
advocate. It follows that the requests and promises of the defendant and the services of the plaintiff created neither an obligation
nor an inception of obligation, nor any inchoate right whatever
capable of being completed and made into a contract by any subsequent promise.
By reason of that incapacity the present case is distinguished
from Lampleigh. vs. Bratliwaite, and the cases following thereon.
In all of them the defendant was assumed to have received from
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the plaintiff such a valuable consideration as would have made a
valid contract, if a promise had been miade before the consideration
had passed. Here the defendant received nothing from the plaintiff which was capable of forming a consideration to support apromise, at whatever time such promise may have been made.
In Lampleigh vs. Brathwaite it was assumed that the journeys
which the plaintiff performed at the request of the defendant, and the
other services he rendered, would have been sufficient to make any
promise binding if it had been connected therewith in one contract.
The peculiarity of the decision lies in connecting a subsequent
promise with a prior consideration after it had been executed.
Probably, at the present day, such service on such request would
have raised a promise by implication to pay what it was worth, and the
subsequent promise of a sum certain would have been evidence for
the jury to fix the amount: On the same principle the cases cited
in sequel to Lampleig v. Brathwaite are also distinguished. In
each of those cases tie defendant had, by the permission of the
plaintiff, received value belonging to the plaintiff which was sufficient to support any promise. As to one class, the original promise
was excluded by the Statute of Frauds; but a subsequent promise
was held to be evidence to support an action on an account stated:
(Pinchin vs. Clilcot, 3 Car. & P.; Sego vs. Deane, 4 Bing. 459;
Tapping vs. Ward, 10. B. 858.) As to another class a claim in
equity to money was converted into a cause of action at law by an
express promise to pay to the plaintiff: (Roper vs. folland, 3 Ad.
& E. 99; Topham vs. 2Moreeraft, 8 Ad. & E. 972; Moore vs. Bill, 2
Peake 10.) For these reasons we think that the plaintiff's case is
not within the principle of Lampleigh vs. Brathwaite, and we do
not consider it to be our duty to extend the application of that
principle.
With respect to the claim for compensation for leaving Birmingham and coming to London, and for services in issuing publications
for the purpose of creating a prepossession in favor of the defendant, there are several answers, of which two will suffice. The
first is, that these services were ancillary to the service as an advocate, and if the principal service could not be the subject of a con-
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tract, neither could any service wheh was merely accessary thereto
and of no value without the principal. The second is, that the account is stated of the total of the claims, and if any one of the
claims of undefined amount is to be omitted the statement of the
account is disproved, and the action founded on such statement
of account fails.
We have now gone through the whole of the case, and we come to
the conclusion that the plaintiff has not established a cause of action. It follows that the rule must be made absolute to enter the
verdict for the defendant. If the judgment on this part of the
rule should be reversed in a court of error, it will then be our duty
to dispose of the remaining part relating to a new trial, and following the precedent in Betts vs. Menzies, 28 L. J. 370, Q. B., 4
Jur. Rep. N. S. 277, we order the part of the rule relating thereto
to be suspended until further order.
Rule absolute to enter the verdict for the defendant.
It is seldom that we are presented
with a case of such interest as the foregoing. Not only is the subject of the
first importance as it concerns the rights
and duties of the profession, and still
more its habits and tone of feeling, but
the case itself, as an exhibition of skill,
learning, and judicial eloquence, is
worthy of our most attentive study.
Though we regret the position of Mr.
Kennedy, as derogatory to the character
and reputation of the bar, yet we cannot but admire the industry and learning with which he gathered his materials, and the boldness, ingenuity, and
forensic skill with which he attacked the
time-honored principle of the honorarium, so long the boast and pride of the
English bar. But it is the judgment of
the Court which more than all gives the
case its value. It is undoubtedly one
of the best judgments given by any
Court in our day. It does not shirk the
main question or decide upon a technicality, but, with the courage of conscious
ability, grasps at once the true point of

the case, and eniciates the principles
of the law and their application, with
rare judicial art and eloquence. Upon
this case alone, Chief Justice ERLE. may
well be content to rest his reputation,
and his brethren of the bench and the
bar congratulate themselves on the opportunity to show that there are still
among them worthy successors to the
long line of illustrious men who have in
times past adorned the administration
of the law.
The contrary -principle having been
long regarded as settled in America,
these remarks might properly close
here; but, with the example before us
of the opening of a question supposed
to be closed for centuries, and its discussion and solemn adjudication upon
principle as well as precedent, it may
not be thought impertinent briefly to
review the decisions and the arguments
upon which they were rested.
One of the earliest reported cases in
favor of the power of counsel I sue as
such, is Brackenridge vs. Mckadiane
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Add. 49, a Common Pleas decision in
Pennsylvania, made in 1793. In this,
though the counsel who sued was afterwards a distinguished Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the Court was presided over by a learned and able Judge,
who reported the case, yet the opinion
briefly states that an attorney in Pennsylvania may.recover for his services as
counsel, over and above the legal fee
due him as attorney. When, however,
the point first came before the Supreme
Court, in 1819, Mooney vs. Lloyd, 5 S. &
R. 412, it was elaborately argued, and
the decision in Brackenridge vs. McFarland overruled: Chief Justice TILGHEMAN
saying, "the policy of refusing this
remedy has not been adopted without
great consideration. The field is ample
and would admit of a long discussion.
But it is enough for us that no principle of law has been more" clearly laid
down, and that there is sufficient evidence of its being one of those principles which were adopted on the settlement of Pennsylvania." This decision,
however, was in turn overruled in Gray
vs. Brackenridge, 2 Penn. 75 (1830), the
Court being composed of new Judges,
with the exception of Giasox, C. J.,
who expressed his satisfaction in overruling that case. In Foster v.Jack, 4
Watts 334 (1835), the later doctrine was
affirmed. GiasoN, C. J., saying that he
was dissatisfied with the decision in
Mooney v. Lloyd. "On principle, because I was unable to comprehend why
a valuable consideration might not raise
an implied promise, as well as support
an express one; and for its consequences, because I felt assured it would
be found entirely incompatible with the
business and necessities of both counsel
and client here." "The dignity of the
robe, instead of any principle of policy,
furnishes all the arguments that can be
brought to the support of it at the present day." Since this case, the law has

been considered settled in Pennsylvania: Baulsbaugh vs. Frazer, 7 Harris 95
(1852). The same principle has been
adopted expressly in many of the other
States. Vermont, Vilas vs. Downer, 21
Vt. (6 Washb.) 419; Massachusetts.
Thurston vs. Percival, I Pick. 415 ,
Ames vs. Gilman, 10 Met. 239; New
York, Lynch vs. Willard, 6 Johns. Ch.
342; Stevens vs. Adams, 23 Wend. 57,
26 Id. 451: Wilson vs. Burr, 25 Wend.
386; Merritt vs. Lambert, 10 Paige 352;
Wallis vs. Loubat, 2 Denio 607; Delaware, Stevens vs. Monges, 1 Harrington
127; South Carolina, Duncan vs. Breithaupt, 1 -McCord 149; Clendenin v.
Black, 2 Bailey 488; Ohio, Christy ve.
Douglas, Wright. 485; Kentucky, Rust
vs. Larue, 4 Litt. 417; Caldwell vs. Shepherd, 6 Monr. 389; Tennessee, Newnan
vs. Washington, Mart. & Yerg. 79; Missouri, Webb vs. Browning, 14 Mo. 354;
Texas, Baird vs. Ratcliff, 10 Tex. 81:
and Florida, Carter vs. Bennett, 6 Fla.
214. The American doctrine therefore
may be considered settled in favor of
the power to recover, in all the States,
with the honorable exception of New
Jersey. In Seely vs. Crane, 3 Green 35.
itwas expressly decided that counsel fees
could not be recovered eo nomine in New
Jersey; and this decision was affirmed
in Van Atta vs. McKinney, 1 Harr. 235.
In some of the cases above cited, the
common law rule is not urged at all.
and in very few of them does it receive
any adequate discussion. In some, the
distinction between attorneys and counsellors oradvocates, generally considered
abolisled in this country, is attempted
to be preserved, though the same persons act in all of those capacities. But
even in these cases the distinction is
made merely to limit the attorney to his
legal fees, and to allow him for such of
his services as do not come strictly
under the function of an attorney, his
action on a gLfaniit

meruit.
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The decisions generally are based on
the ground of implied contract, as for
other services, and the summary manner in which they set aside so timehonored a principle of the common law
is not a little remarkable. The best
argument on this side will be found in
the opinion of CRARB, J., in Newnan vs.
Washington, Mart. & Yerg. 79. "It is
consonant with the nature of our institutions that faithful labors should be
rewarded by reasonable remuneration."
"We have here no separate orders of
society; none of those exclusive privileges which distinguish the lawyer in
England." On the score of public Policy, it is the best. "Leave the doctrine
as desired, and the happy moment will
always be selected by the unconscientious, when the anxious suitor is elevated by hope or depressed by fear, to
extort unreasonable advances in the
shape of gratuities. But let it be known
that industry and attention and ardor
will certainly be compensated by reasonable payment, and you encourage forbearance on the part of the attorney or
advocate. He is not tempted to get what
he can while the fever of his client is
up; he waits in security until his labors
are performed, his services rendered,
knowing that he will at last receive
what a disinterested jury shall award."
This argument, it. seems to us, is more
specious than sound. Under any rule,
the unconscientious will seize an opportune moment to extort gratuities from
anxious clients; and the object to be
aimed at is not the hopeless one of total
prevention of oppression and rascality
in individual cases, but the elevation of
the general tone of the profession. And
it is with no disrespect to that ancient
institution, that we most earnestly deprecate a rule which commits the estimate
of arduous professional labor to the
uncertain tribunal of a jury box. For

what is a jury trial between counsel
and client, but a family quarrel, 'which
strangers are called it.to witness and
decide-. scandalous affair which inevitably lowers the profession in the estimation of all bystanders?
It.is said that the Paris bar regards
such suits as dishonorable, though allowed by the law of France, and would
punish an advocate who should sue, by
striking him from the list (Sharswood,
Prof. Ethics, p. 84) ; and it is true that
the feeling of the bar in America, at
least in the large cities, will generally
prevent any but an aggravated case from
going to suit. But who shall say how
long this will be so, or where the relaxation of professional tone shall stop,
which is thus begun?
It is said, moreover, that the common
law rule is a mere matter of theory,
supported, as C. J. GinsoN, expresses
it, by "the dignity of the robe." As a
mere question of remuneration, we may
concede that there is no practical difference at all. No one pretends that the
English bar, under their rule, is less
liberally, less promptly, or less generally paid than ours; the fact, from
various causes, is notoriously the reverse. And this objection, therefore,
appears to be the strongest argument in
favor of the old rule; for what is more
desirable than the preservation of "the
dignity of the robe," so to speak, the
fostering of that spirit which binds the
bar together as brethren of an honorable profession, and subjects their general tone and character to the restrictions
of a moral force which the most reckless
and unprincipled dare not wholly defy ?
So much upon general principle. Upon
authority, the common law rule is not
questioned in our cases, and it is overruled on the vague ground of unsuitableness to our institutions. Why un'
suitable? Not because it deprives the
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lawyer of his just compensation, for the able character may give it so much of
English barrister is atleast as punctually moral precedence as is implied in its
paid as the American attorney. But,, hard-earned title of a learned professays Judge CRABn, "we have here no sion.
We have been led into this length of
separate orders of society." Are we
to understand, then, that it is unsuitable discussion against our .will; for, howbecause it is undemocratic ? Surely, to ever profound our convictions on the
deprive a man of the right to sue for subject, the decisions are made, and we
his services, which belongs to the most must bow to them; but we may at least
menial laborer, is not investing him with venture a hope that this case will chalan aristocratic privilege, dangerous to lenge attention in those states where
republican liberty. And a profession the law has not been expressly decided,
whose ranks are free to all who choose and may even yet arrest what must be
to enter, can never in a country like this conceded to be the general current of
J. T. tL
become an obnoxious aristocracy, though the American decisions.
its dignity, its learning, and its honor-

Court of Common Pleas. Jan. 16, 1863.
BRAMPTON vS. BEDDOES.'
The defendant, a general draper, sold the good-will of his business to the plaintiff
under a written agreement, one of the terms of which was as follows:-" That
the defendant should not carry on, or assist in carrying on, a business such as
is now carried on at 17 Lupus street, Pimlico, being a general drapery and
hosiery business, within two miles of that place." The defendant afterwards
went into the district for the purpose of collecting old debts, and being there
was asked by some -persons to supply them with goods, which he did:
ld, in an action for breach of the agreement against the defendant for carrying
on business within the prescribed limits, that in order to do so to such an extent
as to be a breach of the contract, it was not necessary he should have either
place of business or house within the district.

This case was tried before WILLES, J., in London, when a verdict was found for the plaintiff, leave being r'eserved to set it aside
on the ground that the breach was not proved. The action was
brought for the breach of an agreement, whereby the defendant
was bound not to carry on or assist in carrying on a general drapery and hosiery business within a certain district. The facts were
as follows :The defendant sold his business, which was that of 't general
draper, to the plaintiff, under a written agreement, the following
'7 Law Times Rep. N. S. 67U.
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being one of the terms :-" The said Thomas Beddoes agrees that
he will not carry or assist in carrying on a business such as is now
carried on at 17 Lupus street, Pimlico, being a general drapery
and hosiery business, within two miles of that place, underi the forfeiture of 2001., to be recovered as and in the nature of liquidated
damages."
The defendant afterwards, by his own showing, went into the
district for the purpose of collecting old debts, and whilst there
was asked by some persons to supply them with goods such as were
sold by a general draper, which he did. The defendant, howeer,
had no shop or place of business within the prescribed limits, but
resided in lodgings in Thayer street, which is more than two miles
distant from Lupus street. On behalf of the defendant it was contended that the meaning of the agreement was that there was no
breach unless the defendant had some place of business within the
stipulated distance.
A rule having been obtained on a former day,
Joyce now showed cause, and cited Turner and Another vs. Evans,
2 E. & B. 512.
Hawkins, Q. C. (Rigy with him), in support of the rule.
ERLE, 0. J.-I
am of opinion that what the defendant did was
clearly a breach of the agreement, and that this *rule,therefore,
ought to be discharged. It would not be necessary for a man to
have a permanent shop within the prescribed limits to make a
breach of this agreement. The purpose of the plaintiff in purchasing the good-will of the business from the defendant was to get
his customers; but the defendant has himself supplied them with
goods, and has so prevented the plaintiff from getting their
custom.

WILLIAMS, J.-I

am of the same opinion.

WILLES, J.-I think the "carrying on the same business" does

nct mean that it should be actually carried on in a shop within the
sripulated district, but the sale of goods within that district.
KEATING,

J., concurred.

Rule discharged.

